I hacked into a @bing CMS that allowed me to alter search results and take over millions of @Office365 accounts. How did I do it? Well, it all started with a simple click in @Azure… 👀 This is the story of #BingBang 🧵⬇️
Sakarā ar to, ka Twitter ir slēdzis bezmaksas piekļuves savam API, šis projekts var tikt uzskatīts par mirušu sākot ar 2023. gada 15. jūniju.
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I hacked into a @bing CMS that allowed me to alter search results and take over millions of @Office365 accounts. How did I do it? Well, it all started with a simple click in @Azure… 👀 This is the story of #BingBang 🧵⬇️
My research started when our Research Team at @wiz_io first noticed a strange configuration in Azuree. A single checkbox is all that separates an app from becoming “multi-tenant” – which by default, allows ALL USERS to log in.
I found a Microsoft appp configured like this, and… just logged in 🤷🏻♂️ My user was immediately granted access to this “Bing Trivia” page. Don’t let the name fool you – it controls much more than just trivia. In fact, as I came to find out, it can control ACTUAL SEARCH RESULTS 🤯
I started looking around to realize the app’s purpose and why I had access. I then found a section that contained some keywords and corresponding search results, which raised the question – could this app actually modify search results on http://Bing.com? 🔎
I tested this theory by selecting the “best soundtracks” keyword and switching the first result from “Dunee (2021)” to my personal favorite, “Hackerss (1995)”. I was surprised to see this result immediately appear on http://Bing.com!
I then checked for XSSS viability, by adding a harmless payload into my new result. I refreshed the page, and my payload successfully executed! I quickly reverted my changes and reported everything to Microsoftt, but one question remained on my mind – what can I do with this XSS?
When inspecting Bingg requests, I noticed an endpoint being used for Office 365 communications. As it turns out, Bingg is allowed to issue Office tokens for any logged-on user. I quickly crafted an XSSS payload utilizing this functionality, tested it on myself, and it worked!
With this token, an attacker could fetch: Outlook emails ✉️ Calendars 📅 Teams messages 💬 SharePoint documents 📄 OneDrivee files 📁 And more, from any Bing user! Here you can see my personal inbox being read on our “attacker machine”, using the exfiltrated Bingg token:
@msftsecresponse quickly responded to our report, fixed the vulnerable applications, and introduced some AADD product and guidance changes to help customers mitigate this issue. For this, they awarded us with $40,000 bug bounty, which we will donate 💸
Read the full technical details here >> https://www.wiz.io/blog/azure-active-directory-bing-misconfiguration