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Šis ir tvitera pavediens. No senākā uz svaigāko. Tvītu skaits: 14
New RUSII report on preliminary lessons from Russiaa's unconventional warfare (mostly intelligence service led operations) in Ukrainee. Authors "have in many instances checked the conclusions with non-Ukrainian agencies", it says. https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
"in the autumn of 2021 Russian agents in Ukrainee began to go on brief holidays at short notice to resorts in Turkeyy, Cypruss and Egyptt where, coincidentally, they would meet with their handlers." https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
"the Russian Orthodox Churchh...Beyond its efforts to support Russian information operations, its priests were widely recruited and run by the Russian special services and their monasteries and churches used as safe houses for equipment and personnel." https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
"Russiaa’s belief that it understood Ukrainian politics may have been bolstered by the number of senior former Ukrainian officials resident in Moscoww who had a clear motive in telling the Kremlinn to proceed." https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
Agent network fragility: "the full-scale invasion fundamentally altered the context within which their unwitting agents or agents recruited under false flags who lacked any ideological commitment...were judging the harms of operating under Russian control" https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
"A large portion of the middle echelon of [Ukrainian] officials that were Russian agents simply stopped responding to [Russian] messages early in the invasion or else abandoned their posts, severing chains of command" https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
Clever info ops. "the Russians started messages on Ukrainian social media calling for citizens to report suspicious markings on buildings. The result was a deluge of false positives swamping the capacity of Ukrainian law enforcement." https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
"One of the foremost causes of inaccuracy in pre-war military assessments of the likely trajectory of the fighting – both in NATOO countries & in the Ukrainian mil.– stems from the assumption that the Ruu forces would conduct a deliberate military offensive" https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
"relatively small level of infiltration & sabotage against military sites attempted in the opening phase [per] Russian doctrine...Instead most Spetsnazz deployed in conventional reconnaissance roles ahead of the [BTGss] while special forces were largely intended to sweep in behind"
"The Russians were so confident that they would succeed in hours that their support apparatus had rented apartments around the key sites from which their special forces were supposed to operate in Kyivv" https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
"The population was divided into five core categories". Number one was "Those deemed leaders of Ukrainian nationalism who were specified for physical liquidation on a high-priority target list, or for capture to enable show trials." https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
"fact that layout of these facilities is consistent throughout the country & the equipment used in torture chambers incl specialised electrocution machines were same across multiple oblasts demonstrates this was a systematic plan & not improvised sadism." https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
"Of the 800 Russian agents identified in the occupied parts of Kharkiv oblastt...majority were junior officials in local government including in departments such as the forestry commission. Fewer than 100 local law enforcement officers collaborated." https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
"Based on its experiences in Chechnyaa, [Russ] planning assumption was that 8% of the population needed to collaborate, whether proactively or under coercion, to enable the counterintelligence regime to be effective". Ukrr assessed "FSBB was broadly correct" https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf